The Efect of Differences in Buyer and Non-Buyer Characteristics on Equilibrium Price-Elasticities: an Empirical Study on the Italian Automobile Market by Franco Mariuzzo
The Eﬀect of Diﬀerences in Buyer and Non-Buyer
Characteristics on Equilibrium Price-Elasticities:








This paper provides an empirical analysis of own- and cross-price elas-
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data with a special section having information on individuals buying and
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11 Introduction
Price elasticities are a fundamental key variable in the understanding of markets:
computations of the percentage change of the market share of a product to its
own (or its competitors) percentage price change depict a determinant picture
of the underlying competitive environment. The relevance of this information
is, as a matter of fact, stressed by the frequent use the Lerner Index has in the
Industrial Economics literature.1 However, if this relation is straightforward
in case of homogenous products (and symmetric ﬁrms), its extension to the
case of diﬀerentiated products asks for more sophisticated tools that are to be
introduced in the next sections.2 The main contribution of our paper is to shed
light in the important implications of a reﬁnement in these tools.
Our paper uses aggregate industry data and estimates the own- and cross-
price elasticities of substitution for the 1989-2000 Italian automobile industry.
Aware that Berry Levinsohn and Pakes (2004) and Petrin (2002) highlight a cer-
tain diﬃculty in getting good demand estimates from aggregate industry data,
we add our aggregate data a special microdata section with rich information
on the characteristics of households buying and non-buying vehicles. We use
this information to recover proper income distributions that will be lymph of
some of our simulations. We are not aware previous literature dealing with ag-
gregate level data and exogenous individual information was able to separate
1The Lerner Index is deﬁned as a weighted average of each ﬁrm’s margin, with weights
g i v e nb yt h eﬁrms’ market shares. It is often used in the literature to represent the relation
between market power (the level of competition) and price elasticities.
2Mariuzzo, Walsh and Whelan (2003) uses a nested logit approach to question the existence
of a relation between ﬁrm size and market power in the Irish diﬀerentiated Carbonated Soft
Drinks.
2the characteristics of buyers from those of non-buyers. The fact that often dis-
tributions of these characteristics largely diﬀer can raise a speciﬁcation issue.
Our data show that the income distributions of individuals buying new vehicles
signiﬁcantly diﬀer from those of the entire sample. This diﬀerence is not only
conﬁned to the means of the distributions but concerns, also, their concentra-
tion, and it is this latter that makes our microdataset extremely important. In
fact, controlling for the subset of individuals buying vehicles let us not only
to reduce the simulation errors (increasing, subsequently, the eﬃciency of our
estimates) but, also, to properly identifying the parameters that enter (directly)
the computation of our price elasticities.
Two main approaches can be distinguished in the empirical automobile lit-
erature. A ﬁrst one that uses disaggregate consumer data and a second one
that uses aggregate industry data. The former, is mainly based on logit models
that estimate demand at an individual level either directly Berkovec (1985) or,
through nested versions assuming a priori ordering [Ben-Akiva (1973), McFad-
den (1978), Berkovec and Rust (1985)]. Data are, in this case, required to match
product characteristics with consumer characteristics. In such a way, one allows
both for a high degree of product diﬀerentiation and for consumer heterogeneity
but, as drawbacks, pays both the price of neglecting the supply side, with all
the subsequent equilibrium considerations, and of having a sample that seldom
is fully representative of all marketed models. The former of these issues is
promptly overcome in Goldberg (1995). Goldberg assumes the existence of a
Nash equilibrium and provides an equilibrium analysis of demand and supply
3using a nested model. Another attempt to address an equilibrium analysis, and
robust also to the later of the issues, is proposed by Berry Levinsohn and Pakes
(2004). On the other side, the alternative approach of aggregate industry data
(often the only source of data available) addresses demand and supply and,
survives the critics of eﬃciency by adding exogenous information on individual
characteristics [Berry Levinsohn and Pakes, (1995) - BLP onwards - and Petrin
(2002)]. Among this empirical aggregate industry literature the main paper is
undoubtedly BLP. It oﬀers estimates of demand and supply in the U.S. diﬀer-
entiated automobile markets and suggests ﬁne econometric tools to get more
reliable own- and cross- price elasticities. The authors provide results using a
GMM estimator and suggest simulations to recover market shares [Mac Fadden
(1989), Pakes and Pollard (1989) for details]. In order to get more eﬃcient
estimates, they enrich their product level data with exogenous information on
consumers’ income characteristics but no distinction between buyers and non-
buyers is made. Aware of possible poor demand estimates produced by market
level data, and rather general exogenous individual characteristics, the authors
extend BLP by adding, this time, microdata enriched with consumers’ second
choice information [Berry Levinsohn and Pakes (2004)]. They ﬁnd that unob-
servable consumer attributes (our σk, infra) are both relevant to obtain reliable
substitution patterns and to get better estimates. A similar aim of providing
more precise parameters’ estimates leads Petrin (2002) to improve the market
level data with readily available data that relate the average characteristics of
consumers to the characteristics of the products they purchase. These more
4precise estimation results are then used by the author to evaluate the welfare
beneﬁts of the minivans’ introduction.
Our paper takes an intermediate position between the aggregate market level
data literature and these later subsequent micro-reﬁnements. It departs from
the use of aggregate data and shows the relevance of adding separate information
on the diﬀerent characteristics of the group of individual purchasing and non
purchasing the product. This kind of information is usually available at any
national micro-level survey. The availability of this resource let the researcher
to control for diﬀerences in the characteristics of the group of individuals: i)
purchasing the good; ii) preferring the outside alternative. Especially in the
case of a durable good, such as automobiles, these diﬀerences can be remarkably,
and matter.
Eventually, a main pitfall in all the empirical automobile literature cited
above is due to a non satisfactory treatment of dynamics. Depending on their
expectations about future economic and family conditions, households may pre-
fer to defer their purchase of a new car. The static nature of the considered
models (mainly dictated by data availability) fails to take intertemporal sub-
stitution eﬀects into account and fails, also, to consider parent houses strategic
entry and exit.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section summarizes the evo-
lution of the Italian automobile industry and section 3 describes our data. In
section 4 we outline the underlying theoretical model. Section 5 highlights our
estimation methods which, mainly, follow BLP. Section 6 addresses the compu-
5tational mechanisms. In section 7 we provide our estimation results. Finally,
the paper concludes in section 8.
2 The Italian Automobile Industry
A particular feature of the Italian automobile industry is the dominant role
played by Fiat. Figure I shows the evolution of the Italian (new) automobile
market for the 1989-2000 period split into four diﬀerent geographical areas.3
The graph on the top left highlights the substantial reduction (from a market
share of 60% in 1989 to a market share of 36% in 2000) of the national, mainly
Fiat, unit sales due to the progressive opening of the national market to foreign
competition. This is partly explained by the progressive elimination of import
duties as requested by the European Union and, mostly, by the accelerated com-
petition produced by the European integration. A particular attention deserves
the graph on the bottom right (Far East market shares), for the Far East sales
were originally bounded to market quota. This quota restriction has steadily
been removed up to disappear in 1999.4
A full picture of the state of health of the Italian automobile market is repre-
sented by the trend of total unit sales in Figure II. We observe a sharp collapse,
about 20%, in the total unit sales in year 1992. This strong reduction goes along
with the exit of the Italian Lira from the European Monetary System [(EMS),
October 1992] due to an attempt of the Bank of Italy to maintain the exchange
3We ascribe each parent house an area by virtue of the country where its head oﬃce
is located. We are in this way not addressing the labyrinth of all possible cross mergers,
acquisitions or other market transactions.
4In our estimates we use cross dummies parent house-time to control for this macro eﬀect.
6rate anchored with the other EU currencies (an eﬀect in line with the strong
reduction in the Italian market shares - see Figure I - ) and the subsequent
economic destabilization which followed. The 1992 crisis motivated the heavy
Amato’s ﬁnancial act which behaved an economic stagnation up to 1997, year
when the policy makers intervened with the “scrap-incentives”.5 This turbu-
lence seemingly aﬀected the level of concentration in the Italian market. Table
Io ﬀers three diﬀerent measures of the level of concentration (the indexes C4,
HHI and Gini coeﬃcient). As expected concentration has decreased over time
passing from a high concentrated industry (HHI above 1800) to a moderately
concentrated industry (HHI between 1000 and 1800).6 All indexes well support
this trend.
Table II shows the 1989-2000 trend for some major physical automobile char-
acteristics. We observe increases in cubic capacity and speed to go simultane-
ously along with a reduction in the fuel consumption. This trend is explained by
a change in individual tastes towards faster but more fuel saving cars (dictated
by the almost doubling of the gasoline real prices - Figure III - ). Although Table
II does not report information on airbags and ABS as standard, we approximate
safety by the variable length and (somehow) trunk size. The increased variabil-
ity in all characteristics, but trunk size, let us think to a greater diﬀerentiability
in the marketed products.
Finally, Figure IV oﬀers a picture of the real price-distribution trend. The
time trend can be split into two subperiods: i) 1989-1992: a period where the
5Mariuzzo (2005) oﬀers a story on the eﬀects of the scrap incentives on the level of com-
petition in the market.
6See the 1992 Guidelines. Reprinted in Trade Regulation Reports,J u n e5 ,1 9 9 2 .
7average price (of the marketed automobiles) goes, in his trend, along with the
price variability; ii) 1993-2000: a period of price stabilization associated to a
process of reduction in the price variability which eﬀect might be due to an
increased level of competition in the market.
3T h e D a t a
Our dataset consists of three dimensions: A) Individuals; B) Products; C) Time.
A) Individuals are households drawn from the Bank of Italy Surveys on
Households’ Income and Wealth (SHIW - see Table III - ). Apart from data on
households characteristics such as disposable income, family components, area,
age etc., the dataset holds a special section on vehicles’ purchase (Table IV).
Households are asked whether or not they bought/sold a vehicle in the year
and, in case of transaction, the price they, respectively, paid/received. We use
this information both to obtain better demand estimates and to get a measure
of our outside good market share s0 (share of households not buying a new car
-F i g u r eV- ) . 7 Unfortunately, our data don’t let us to distinguish between used
and new vehicles. We propose in Appendix A a method of minimum distances
to recover the subset of households buying a new vehicle.
B) Products include information on sales, list prices and physical character-
istics such as, engine attribute (kilowatt, cubic capacity), dimension (length),
comfortability (number of doors, trunk size) and performance variables (fuel
consumption, acceleration time, maximum speed). All this information is avail-
7In our estimates we compute the outside good market share from the total number of
households in the economy.
8able in three diﬀerent datasets (two furnished by Editoriale Domus-Quattroruote
and one by Fiat).8 To be more speciﬁc:
i) a former Quattroruote database oﬀers information on prices. We have for
the 1989-2001 period 65715 quarterly prices. We, then, reduce the dataset to
yearly prices by averaging the quarterly prices.
ii) a latter Quattroruote database furnishes information on all auto charac-
teristics introduced above. The original dataset contains 16111 observations, of
which only 11125 are not the same model repeated.9
From 1996 on, the variable fuel consumption (liters*100km) is marked by
three diﬀerent EU standards: 1) urban, 2) sub-urban, 3) mixed, while before
that period the distinction was among: a) urban, b) 90 km/h (sub-urban), c)
120 km/h. Averaging a), b) and c) one gets a good approximation of the mixed
fuel consumption in 3).
iii) Finally, the Fiat database (11246 diﬀerent models) oﬀers information on
market segments (28 exogenous diﬀerent segments), quantities sold each year,
body, type of engine and few characteristic variables such as kilowatt, cubic
capacity and number of doors.
By merging ii) and iii) we obtain, for the 1989-2000 period, a database of
11055 models and, once we consider the models reported in diﬀerent years to
be diﬀerent observations we have a pooled dataset of 46533 observations.10
8A special thank to Andrea Battiston for having patiently added the Fiat dataset the
Editoriale Domus-Quattroruote id codes (Infocar-anno-mese) necessary to merge the two
diﬀerent datasets.
9It could be the case that some of the observations that we consider repeated (the diﬀerence
between 16111 and 11125) diﬀer each other for some characteristics unobservable in our data.
10Models with unit sales below 500 a year have been excluded.
9C) Time includes the years 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000. This partic-
ular spell is constrained to the availability of our Bank of Italy data.
In next section we deﬁne our model/year and diﬀerent model/year which
numerosity is reported in Table V.
4 The Model
The number of competing parent houses (see Table V) is small enough to let us
think the Italian automobile industry as an oligopolistic market structure with
highly diﬀerentiated automobile models. The underlying game is assumed to
be a diﬀerentiated product static game with prices as strategic variables. We
model parent houses as price-setting oligopolists and consumers as price takers
and assume the existence of Nash equilibrium in prices.11 We model demand as
a discrete choice setting where each consumer (household in our data) decides
to buy the car that gives him the highest utility (considering also the utility of
the outside good: not buying a new car) and we model the other side of the
market as multiproduct ﬁrms (the parent houses in Table V) that choose the
prices that maximize their proﬁts.
Let Ft be the set of parent houses in our market and Jt the set of all diﬀerent
models produced at time t and let each parent house ft ∈ Ft to produce at time
t a Jft ⊂ Jt subset of models.
In order to save some notation we drop onwards, when not especially neces-
sary, subscripts f and t.
11Singh and Vives (1984) show the duality of price and quantity assumptions in a diﬀeren-
tiated product setting.
10We assume consumers’ utility to depend on product characteristics, prices
and individual taste parameters. The aggregation of our discrete-choice model of
consumer behavior produces the market demands; while the cost side is based on
the assumption of a functional form and obtained from the ﬁrst order conditions
of the proﬁt maximization.
Before proceeding further we need some deﬁnitions of what is a model in our
framework. The previous section presented our original dataset as containing
11055 models (parent house-name plate-types).12 If one considers the models
reported in diﬀerent years to be diﬀerent observations, one ﬁnds himself with
a pooled dataset of 46533 observations. Both numbers are far too large to run
our implemented algorithms. We have to restrict the number of models. Table
V shows our process of aggregation. We distinguish between model-year and
diﬀerent-model-year.A model-year is a string parent house-name plate which
vector of observed characteristics is the weighted (by unit sales) average of char-
acteristics of types with the same string parent house-name plate.F u r t h e r m o r e ,
as our dataset has a panel component, we deﬁne a model-year to be the same
over time if none of its characteristics has changed more than ±20% over a pe-
riod. It follows what is a diﬀerent-model-year. In the rest of the paper, if not
explicitly stated, we mean by model our model-year jt and interpret jt as an
integer.13
In the following three subsections we follow closely the BLP notation and
12Examples are Fiat-Panda-Young, Fiat-Panda-1100, etc.
13In our estimates we control for diﬀerent-model-years introducing the variable number of
y e a r st h em o d e li sm a r k e t e d .
11describe the demand, the supply (the cost side) and the market equilibrium.14
4.1 The Demand Side
We derive our demand by aggregating a discrete choice model of individual con-
sumer behavior. We are aware that, when choosing among diﬀerent models of
cars, individuals do not restrict their decisions only on prices but, they also con-
sider the diﬀerent characteristics. This approach, suggested by Lancaster (1971,
1991), oﬀers the possibility of moving from the product space to the character-
istic space, which is quite useful when one has (as in our case) to deal with
many products and few characteristics. With this approach we explain better
why products, although physically similar, may diﬀer in consumers’ perception
about quality, durability, status, or services.15 Unfortunately, some character-
istics such as style, reputation and past experience are unobservable to us but,
meanwhile, they are rather frequent determinants of consumers’ demand and
we don’t want to neglect their eﬀects in our model.16
We represent the utility derived by consumer i ∈ I from consuming product
j to be U(ζi,p j,xj,ξj;θ). Where I is the number of individuals in the economy
(households in our case), ζi is a vector of individual i’s characteristics whereas
(p,X,ξ) are vectors and matrices of product characteristics. In our notation
p represents the price vector of our products and X and ξ are our matrix
14In our paper the simultaneous estimate of demand and supply is conﬁn e dt oa ne ﬃciency
reason. However, any normative analysis or policy experiment is conditioned to an underlying
equilibrium and a simultaneous estimate of demand and supply.
15See Anderson, De Palma and Thisse (1992) other than for a good revision of discrete
choice models, for the conditions of a one to one correspondence between the discrete choice
and the address (characteristics) models.
16Manski (1977) argues that the randomness in observed consumer behavior is mainly due
to unobservable characteristics that inﬂuence consumers’ choice.
12of observed and vector of unobserved products’ characteristics, respectively.
Finally, θ includes any parameters that determinate the distribution of consumer
characteristics {α,σ}, as well as, conditional on these characteristics, the utility
parameters that describe the utility surface β and the marginal costs γ.W e
partition θ in θ ={θ1,θ2} where θ1 = {β,γ} is the subset of parameters
that are to be concentrated out of our objective function and θ2 = {α,σ}
the parameters that enter our objective function.
We avoid, onwards, to represent vectors in bold letters and matrices in cap-
ital and bold letters.
From the discrete choice literature McFadden (1981), consumer i chooses
model j ∈ J if and only if it maximizes his utility
U(ζi,p j,x j,ξj;θ) ≥ U(ζi,p r,x r,ξr;θ)f o rj,r =0 ,1,...,J (1)
where r =1 ,...,J alternatives represent purchases of the competing diﬀeren-
tiated products whereas, alternative zero r = 0, or the outside alternative,
represents, in our case, both the option of not purchasing any of those products
(allocating therefore all expenditures to other commodities) and the option of
purchasing a used car.
We expect consumers with diﬀerent individual characteristics to make dif-
ferent choices. For this reason, we deﬁne
Aj =
©
ζ : U(ζ,p j,x j,ξj;θ) ≥ U(ζ,p r,x r,ξr;θ), for r =0 ,1,...,J
ª
to be the set of values of individual characteristics ζ that induce the choice
13of good j ∈ J. Assuming ties occur with zero probability (which means the
distribution function P of ζ is absolute continuous with respect to the Lebesgue




P0 (dζ) j =0 ,1,...,J (2)




sj (·) = 1] the market shares. We describe in section 6 how to compute
sj (·).
Finally, given the number of consumers I in the economy one can derive the
aggregated demand functions
qj (·)=Isj (p,x,ξ;θ), for j ∈ J (3)
which are nonlinear functions of the observable and unobservable product char-
acteristics.
The next step is to assume some shape to the utility function. As well known
f r o mt h ed i s c r e t ec h o i c el i t e r a t u r e[ w e l ld o c u m e n t e di nA n d e r s o n ,D eP a l m aa n d
Thisse (1992)] a utility additively separable in its product characteristics [our δj
deﬁned in (6)] and consumers’ characteristics (the error component ²ij)p r o v i d e s
poor substitution eﬀects. That is, conditional on market shares, elasticities of
substitutions do not depend, in that case, on the observable characteristics of
the product. This can easily be reformulated with an example. Suppose Fiat
500 (a cheap Italian car) and a Ferrari (which prestige everybody knows) have
close market shares (our sj) then, a change in the price of a Porsche (another
luxury car which prestige is well known) should aﬀect both models in the same
14way. Which is hard to believe. We need a speciﬁcation that captures the idea
that goods with closer characteristics are expected to have higher cross-price
elasticities. What we have in mind is, whenever individuals have preferences for
some speciﬁc characteristics, we expect them to have a potential second choice
in the subset of cars with similar characteristics. Furthermore, whenever a new
car enters the market, we expect it to have a higher eﬀect on the demand of
cars with similar characteristics. In order to get more reasonable substitution
patterns we suggest a functional form that allows for interaction between in-
dividual and product characteristics (known in the literature as random utility
models). Following BLP we nest a random coeﬃcient model into the following
Cobb-Douglas utility function






where f (y) is some function of the individual income.17 Finally, ²ij (assumed
to be i.i.d. across products and consumers). We assume D(·) to be linear in
logs and K ≥ K1,t h e n
uij = −αpj + σy ln(f (yi) − pj)+
K P
k=1
βkxjk + ξj +
K1 P
k=1
σkxjkνik + ²ij (5)
for j =1 ,...,J, while
ui0 = α0 ln(f (yi)) + ξ0 + σ0νi0 + ²i0
where (νi0,νi1,...,νiK1) is a vector of idiosyncratic consumer tastes that in-
teract with product characteristics (alias marginal utility of characteristics); xj1
17We assume the function of income to have the following functional form:
pj +1i fyi <p j +1 ,∀i ∈ I,j ∈ J
yi otherwise .
15is a dummy vector and σk the standard deviation of the marginal utility distri-
butions. This representation assumes individuals to have diﬀerent preferences
for each diﬀerent observable characteristic. The eﬀect of xk units of charac-
teristic k on the marginal utility is (βk + σkνik). One may observe, from the
distribution of tastes for characteristic k, how, higher values of βk (the mean)
or σk (the standard deviation) explain an increase in the share of consumers
buying cars with higher k characteristic values. Moreover, the value of σk is
relevant in explaining the substitution eﬀects. Let’s suppose an increase in the
price of a car with high k characteristic. In this case, consumers who substitute
away from that car will: i) in case of a low variance of the marginal utility
associated with characteristic k (low σk), not tend to substitute towards other
high k cars; ii) whereas, in case of high σk, the opposite is true (similar prod-
ucts become better substitutes). This eﬀect is simply explained by the marginal
utility for the k characteristic.18 A similar argument is valid also for the price
income eﬀect.
It is important to notice how the utility in (5) can be decomposed into:
i) a common (to all consumers) mean component
δj ≡− αpj +
K P
k=1
βkxjk + ξj (6)
ii) a deviation from that mean




18Once we scale E(ν2
ik)=1 , we get that, the mean and variance of the marginal utility
associated to the k characteristic are, respectively, βk and σ2
k. In our estimates we use the
Delta method to control for the relation between the variance parameters σ2
k and the estimated
standard deviations |σk|.
16where µij (the heterogeneity in consumer tastes) depends on the interac-
tion between consumer preferences (νi) and product characteristics (xj)
and the relation between the simulated incomes [f(yi)] and prices (pj)
iii) an ²ij error term i.i.d. across products and consumers.
If the above decomposition has the advantage of providing more reliable sub-
stitution patterns, it has also the drawback of requiring more complex econo-
metric procedures.
4.2 The Cost Side
Our partial equilibrium analysis is also partial in the sense we are only consider-
ing the Italian market. The limit of this approach is that, we are assuming the
prices ﬁxed by diﬀerent parent houses in the Italian market, to be independent
of the set of prices decided by the same companies (and competitors) on the
foreign markets. We face such restriction by assuming a cost function additive
in the Italian and foreign production which raises, unfortunately, the drawback
of conﬁning our analysis to a linear cost function. On the supply side we assume










where subscripts Ita and Ita stand, respectively, for the Italian and foreign
market and qj = qIta
j +qIta
j .W ed e n o t ew i t hw and ω respectively, the observed
and unobserved subset of cost characteristics, and with γ the coeﬃcients to be
estimated.19 F is a ﬁxed cost. We need to distinguish between Italian and
19It could be the case that a parent house-name plate has characteristics that vary among
the diﬀerent countries they are marketed. In that case, the following functional form would
17foreign markets, for we only have data on the Italian production (we know
only qIta
j ). This drawback forces us to address variable costs in the following







j exp(wjγ + ωj). (9)
We omit onwards in our notation superscript Ita.
Since C (qj;·) > 0 we get our marginal cost to be loglinear in the following




≡ ln(mcj)=wjγ + ωj. (10)
We expect w to be inclusive of the relevant characteristics observed by all
consumers. For example larger cars or, cars with higher unobserved (to us)
characteristic values, are expected to be more costly to produce.
4.3 Market Equilibrium
Given the demand system in (3), the proﬁts of multiproduct parent house f





(pj − mcj)qj (11)



























18from which we get our price equilibria.






























which components of (14) are going to be explained in our computational section
6.
It is possible now to rewrite our ﬁrst order condition in vector notation
s − ∆(p − mc) = 0 (15)
and solve it for the price-cost markup
p = mc + ∆−1s. (16)
We deﬁne the markup vector to be
b ≡ ∆−1s
such that the problem spreads in the following pricing equation
ln(pj − bj)=wjγ + ωj. (17)
The next section introduces our adopted econometric procedures.
195 GMM Estimator
The fact that producers know the value of the unobserved (to us) product char-
acteristics generates correlation between prices and unobserved product charac-
teristics (cars with higher unmeasured quality should be sold at higher prices)
and one has to face a simultaneity issue.20 C o n c e r n e dw i t ht h i si s s u e ,w ea s -






= E [ωj (·;θ0)|z] = 0 (18)
with z =[ x,w] our demand and supply observed characteristics and θ0 the true
parameters value. Although relatively strong, this assumption does not require
prices to be uncorrelated with unobservables but only the observed product
characteristics to be exogenous in our model. We make use of this conditional










and use a General Method of Moments [GMM, Hansen (1982)] to simultaneously











where P0 is the population distribution, Hj(z) is the matrix of functions of
our exogenous observable characteristics (instruments, infra)a n dT (z)i sa2 x 2
matrix that adjusts for correlation between demand and supply unobservables.21
20Moreover, aggregate demand (3) is a non linear function of product characteristics.
21See Hayashi (2000) for a good reference on GMM and pp. 856-857 of BLP for details on
the correction matrix T(z).





















where L = Lξ+Lω is the total number of instruments used, respectively, on our
demand and cost side. The fact that L>|x| + |w| (overidentiﬁcation) conﬁnes






is the weigthing matrix (deﬁned infra in the computational section).
Notice that the minimization of (21) is only with respect to the parameter set
θ2 ⊂ θ which means we use a two step non linear GMM estimation procedure.









V = V1 + V2
where Γ is the gradient of (20) with respect to the θ parameters.22 V1 arises from
the process generating the product characteristics and V2 from the simulation
process.23
The following subsection lists and explains the choice of our instruments.
22The gradient of the non linear parameters on the cost side is computed numerically.
23In our estimates we compute the estimated simulation variance b V2 b ye m p l o y i n gaM o n t e
Carlo procedure that replicates the simulations 50 times.
215.1 Instruments
We deﬁne Hj(z) to be the matrix of functions of our exogenous observable char-
acteristics. We use as instruments, apart from the variables x and w themselves,
the following functional forms:
i) Each period, the average product characteristics and standard deviations
of other products (6= j) produced by parent house f. These instruments
are good cost shifters, for they capture economies of scale: the more similar
are the diﬀerent products produced by the same parent house, the higher
are the derived economies of scale. Cost shifters are common across prod-
ucts of the same parent house and short run shocks are (once allowed for
cross dummies parent house-time) uncorrelated with these factors.
ii) Each period, the average product characteristics produced by other parent
houses (6= f). As cost shifter they capture the cost eﬃciency of parent
house f with respect to its competitors. Short run shocks are (once allowed
for cross dummies parent house-time) uncorrelated with these instruments.
iii) Each period, the sum of the products produced by parent house f.T h e s e
are both cost and demand shifters and capture scale economies and de-
mand spillovers.
In our estimates we run an overidentiﬁcation test to verify the validity of
the above instruments.
The next subsection describes our computation procedure.
226 Computation
We write our individual i’s utility for product j =1 ,2,...J in period t ∈ T as
uijt = −αpjt + σy ln
·










σkxjktνikt + ²ijt (23)
where yit are the simulated individual incomes with i ∈ ns and t ∈ T.
Whereas, our utility for the outside good is
ui00t = ξ0t |{z}
δ0t
+ α0 ln(yi0t(·)) + σ0νi00 | {z }
µi0ot
+ ²i00t
Since each individual’s choices are invariant to i) multiplication of utility by
each person speciﬁc positive constant; ii) addition to utility of any person speciﬁc
number (i.e. aﬃne transformations), we can normalize α0 = σ0 = ξ0t =0 .
6.1 Simulations
We draw our vector ζ =( fy,1,ν1,1,...,νK1,1;...;fy,T,ν1,T,...,νK1,T)f r o mam u l -
tivariate normal distribution with zero mean and identity variance-covariance
matrix and from consumer’s income distribution (assuming independence be-
tween the diﬀerent distributions).24 We draw each period t ∈ T, nsx(K1 +1 )
individual observations (nsxK1 from the multinormal distribution and nsx1
from our Bank of Italy special data section).25 A good feature of our Bank
24The underlying assumption of simulating observations from a multivariate normal distri-
bution is that individuals like some characteristics and dislike others. For example individual
i might like speed but not length etc.
25In our empirical procedure we take 100 draws for each of the 6 periods, for a total 600 draws
and, in order to avoid problems in our minimization procedure, we censor our multivariate
normal distribution to 99%.
23of Italy microdataset is that it let us to distinguish between the income dis-
tributions of those who purchased a vehicle and those who did not. Table VI
highlights the signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the income distributions of those individ-
uals who purchased a vehicle versus the entire sample. Individuals purchasing
a new vehicle have not only higher incomes but, also, more concentrated in-
come distributions. We observe that the diﬀerences in the two distributions are
statistically signiﬁcant both in their means and variance ratio. We name the
income distributions of the entire sample as “coarse” income distributions; the
income distributions of those purchasing a vehicle as “ﬁne” income distribu-
tions. In our results we evaluate the diﬀerences in the estimated elasticities of
substitution produced by the “coarse”( a si nB L P )v e r s u st h e“ ﬁne”i n c o m ed i s -
tributions. Of course using, as in BLP, exogenous information on the “coarse”
income distributions of the entire population raises an issue of speciﬁcation.
The next subsection outlines the full estimation procedure.
6.2 The Estimation Procedure
As in BLP we obtain our market shares in two stages. In the ﬁrst stage we
integrate out (each period/market) over the distribution of ² (assumed to be a
Type 2 Extreme Value) and obtain the following logistic [conditional on indi-






which notation have already met with in (14). φijt is the probability individ-
ual i purchases product j in period t. In a second stage, we integrate out (each




The non closed solution of (25) asks for a simulation procedure. An immedi-










Product j’s market share is therefore the result of an average individual
probability. At this point, we are only left with the determination of our δjt
(the mean component of our utility function). As in BLP we avoid its lack of
analytical solution by using a contraction mapping operator
T(Pns,t;θ) [δjt] ' δjt +l n( sjt) − ln[sjt(·)] (27)
which is nothing but a recursive method to determine δ (·). A recursive method
that depends, among all, on the parameters θ to be estimated.
Once we have computed the mean utilities [δjt(·)] we can explicit our demand
unobservables
ξjt = δjt(·;θ2) − xjtβ (28)
and use the pricing equation (16) to explicit our supply unobservables
ωjt =l n( mcjt(·;θ2)) − wjtγ. (29)
Eventually, we have all the tools to describe our computation procedure:
25(I) Use simulations and compute the market shares (26);
(II) Use the contraction mapping (27) and determine the mean utility relation
δ = xβ + ξ;
(III) Call up the pricing equation [the Augmented Lerner Index (13)] and derive
the marginal cost relation ln(mc)=wγ + ω;
(IV) Use a linear GMM to simultaneously estimate the utility surface param-
eters (β) and the marginal costs parameters (γ) conditional on the θ2
subset of parameters [θ2 = {α,σ}];
(V) Get the unobservables ξ and ω and interact them, once corrected for the
correlation between demand and supply, with a function of the product
characteristics H (our instruments) as to get the moments G(·)t ob e
minimized in (21);26
(VI) Known G, one is only left with the estimation of the parameters {α,σ}.
This requires to originally set the weighting matrix W to (H0H)−1,a s
requested in a 2SLS estimator and use the Nelder-Mead simplex method
to minimize (21).27





The full procedure is summarized as follows (iteration numbers are denoted
by subscript squared brackets):
26Notice that the price parameters α that enters our mean utility (δj)i sa l s oe n t e r i n gt h e
markup function. Since we need to estimate the markup as to explicit the unobservables in
the supply side, we have to include α in the subset of parameters θ2 that enter non linearly
in our GMM function.
27See Lagarias et al. (1998) for a description of the Nelder-Mead procedure.






























2) Repeat step 1) (where θ2 is always ﬁxed at the starting value θ2[0])u n t i lt h e





≡ e δ then, simultaneously estimate d {β,γ} (see steps II-
IV above) and get the residuals ξ and ω;
3) Apply the Nelder-Mead ﬁxed point minimization to (21) and output d θ2[1].
Repeat steps 1-3 above until the Nelder-Mead procedure converges.
4) Minimize the function (21) twice to better ensure a global minimum. Then
repeat the minimization a third time but this time replace the weighting




















This concludes the description of our estimation procedure.28
The next section presents our estimates when either the “coarse”o rt h e
“ﬁne” exogenous income distributions are used.
28Ar a n d o mc o e ﬃcient model with only demand side is well explained in Nevo (2000) and
Nevo (2001). Nevo also oﬀers in his homepage a Matlab version of the algorithms to estimate
the demand side. In our estimates we have extended those original ﬁles to our demand and
supply version.
277R e s u l t s
Tables VII and VIII show, respectively, the results of our estimates in case of
exogenous income distributions drawn from a sample of the entire population
( T a b l eV I I ,b a s e do nt h e“ coarse” income distributions), the reﬁned income
distributions drawn from a sample of the population of buyers (Table VIII, based
on the “ﬁne” income distributions).29 As previously outlined, we pool our data
and capture part of the potential correlation among same-models (section 4)
by introducing a variable (modrep) that reports the number of periods a model
stays in the market and allow for diﬀerent ﬁxed eﬀects such as years, segments,
parent houses and the cross eﬀects year-parent house.
In what follows we only describe the results of Table VIII omitting, on pur-
pose, those similar of Table VII. We start with the demand side. The parameter
β2 associated to modrep tells us the longer a product stays in the market, the
lower consumers perceive its quality (although its eﬀect is not highly signi-
ﬁcative). The other demand parameters show that individuals tend to prefer
long and fast cars and to be partly adverse to the characteristic trunk size.
If no explanation deserve the signs of the β parameters associated to length
and speed, we need to draw a line on that associated to alimentation (β3).
Although our variable fuel consumption is expressed in monetary value and
controls for cheaper diesel price, individuals still prefer diesel to leaded gasoline
cars. Seemingly our consumers are aware that one of the positive particularities
29Since we want to compute the pure distorsion ensuing the two diﬀerent income distribu-
tions, we base our comparisons on the same set of instruments, the same starting values for
the non-linear parameters and the same (non-income) simulations.
28o ft h ed i e s e le n g i n ei st ob em o r er e s i s t a n t( w h i c hc o m e st ot h ep r i c eo fh i g h e r
marginal costs, γ2) than his alternative leaded gasoline. Other interesting re-
sults, although not reported in the Table, are that Italian parent houses and
small car producers generate (on average) higher market shares; reﬂecting in-
dividual tastes for national products and smaller cars.30 Regarding the supply
side, all the γ parameters are of the expected (positive) sign. A positive sign
means that the higher the value of a k characteristic, the larger is its eﬀect
on the marginal cost. Particularly, faster and longer cars are more costly to
produce. Concerning the non linear parameters the high value of the parameter
σ2, associated to cubic capacity is telling us that individuals buying a low cubic
capacity car prefer to replace that car with a similar low cubic capacity car;
whereas individuals buying a high cubic capacity car prefer to replace it with
another high cubic capacity car. Finally, a particular description deserve the
{α,σy} parameters. These parameters aﬀect (directly) our equilibrium price
elasticities of substitutions: higher absolute values of α and σy,i m p l yh i g h e r
elasticities of substitutions. A higher value of σy ampliﬁes the price income
eﬀect: the higher σy, the more price sensitive are lower income individuals. Dif-
ferences in the estimated {b α,b σy} resulting from the use of “ﬁne”o r“ coarse”
income distributions are the main source of discrepancy in the price elasticities
of substitution which magnitudes are emphasized in Table IX. We observe higher
30An important determinant of individuals’ purchases is the after sales services. Apparently
we don’t control for this variables, expecting, then, it to fall into our unobservables. However,
one of the main component of the after sales services is the prompt availability of spare
parts. Our cross dummies parent house-time capture also this eﬀect. Consumers are aware
that national products’ spare parts are readily accessible and for this reason they feel more
conﬁdent in purchasing Italian products. This eﬀect although partly reduced in the latest
years, is still a relevant determinant of individuals’ choice.
29absolute price elasticities when we base our estimations on the “coarse”i n c o m e
distributions. Diﬀerences in the estimated price elasticities are non negligible.
In the next subsection we report our elasticities of substitutions when either,
“ﬁne” income distributions, or “coarse” income distributions, are used.
7.1 Price Elasticities
Price elasticities are a fundamental picture of the understanding of a market.
Parent houses compete with each others and react diﬀerently to exogenous id-
iosyncratic shocks. Which is the percentage change of the market share of model
j to an exogenous shock that aﬀects the production (the price) of model r?H o w
elastic are the demands in a diﬀerentiated product market? All these answers
are englobed in a matrix of price elasticity of substitutions which computation,
in our case, requires to calculate each period a matrix Jt ∗ Jt of values. The























Tables X and XI provide the price elasticities of substitutions (and their
respective interval of conﬁdence) for some selected automobiles marketed in year
2000. Table X refers to the “coarse” income distribution and Table XI to the
“ﬁne” income distribution. Table XI shows that an increase of 1% in the price
of a BMW Serie 3 reduces its market shares of 11.30%, while an increase of 1%
in the price of a Mercedes Class C produces a 0.6% increase in the market share
of Mercedes Class C and the same increase of 1% in the price of a smaller car,
30such as a Fiat Panda, produces a negligible eﬀect (0.007%) on the market shares
o ft h es a m eM e r c e d e sC l a s sC .T h ei n t e r v a l so fc o n ﬁdence oﬀer us a measure
of the reliability of the estimated elasticities.31 Tables X and XI also highlight
a lower price elasticity in the small car markets, which implies a higher market
power in these particular segments. Eventually Table XII decomposes the price
elasticities in i) own-price elasticities; ii) sum of cross-price elasticities coming
from the other models owned by the same ﬁr m( am e a s u r eo ft h ei n t e n s i t yo f
cannibalization); iii) sum of cross-price elasticities coming from models owned
by the other ﬁrms. Again, at the parent house level comes out that estimations
based on “coarse” distributions tend to consistently overestimate absolute price
elasticities.
8 Conclusion
Table VI shows the income distributions drawn from all individuals (“coarse”
income distributions) and the income distributions drawn from the subsample of
buyers (“ﬁne” income distributions) to be statistically diﬀerent. These statisti-
cal diﬀerences are not only conﬁn e dt oam e a ne ﬀect but also to a concentration
eﬀect raising, consequently, a speciﬁcation issue. Furthermore, given the income
distributions (their simulations) enter (directly) the computation of the price
elasticities of substitutions, allowing for the right income distribution ends to
be determinant for proper computations.
We showed that i) the “ﬁne” income distributions produce richer estimates
31We have computed the inteval of conﬁdence using a Bootstrapping technique based on
1000 replications.
31(better ﬁts); ii) the use of “coarse” income distributions overestimate individ-
uals’ sensitivity to a price change. The lesson we draw from this paper is that
m o d e l sl i k eB L P ,w h i c hm a k eu s eo f“ coarse” income distributions, produce an
upper bound to the price elasticities. Our estimations for the Italian automobile
market stress (Table IX) average overestimations above 50%. Diﬀerences that
are quite substantial.
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351 The New Vehicles Dataset
As outlined in Section 3, our data don’t let us to distinguish between used and
new vehicles. To overcome this constraint we assume the market of used vehicle
to clear each period: all vehicles sold by households at a price higher than p
are, within the same year, purchased by other households. Vehicles sold by
households at a price below p are assumed to be sold for scrap.32
We denote with superscripts “n”a n d“ u” new and used vehicles’ purchases
whereas, “s” stands for vehicles’ sales.
Let Iu ⊂ I and In ⊂ I be the subsets of individuals that, respectively, buy
used and new vehicles.33 As stated above, our data only provide information
on the set of individuals who bought a vehicle Iu,n ≡ (Iu ∪ In) ⊂ I and sold
a vehicle Is ⊂ I. Since the order of individual i ∈ I is completely random in








{i :m i n|pi − ph|}
o
for r =1 ,...,|Is|
Iu





;h ≡ Is [r];i 6= h. (31)
where pi ∈ Pu,n is the price paid by individual i ∈ Iu,n whereas, ph ∈ Ps is







32W ea s s u m et h a tv a l u et ob e3 0 0 0E u r oi ny e a r2 0 0 0 .
33Obviously for i ∈ Iu,p u
i ≥ pu
i .





Figure V plots the results of (33). Unfortunately, our results are not completely
satisfactory. Our sample explains only 65-85% of the total sales in the period.
This may be explained both by the fact that households can buy more than a
car a year and by the number of new cars sold for commercial use. Alternatively,
one could think of a sample underestimation.
To be coherent with the assumption that each household buys no more than
a car a year, we recover our outside good market share s0 from the following
ratio
s0t =1−
total sales of new auto in year t
# of households in the economy in year t
.
w h i c hv a l u e sa r ea tt h e i rt u r nd e p i c t e di nF i g u r eV .






























89 91 93 95 97 99
.011906
.138822











1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000








1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Diesel Leaded Gasoline





















1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Standard Deviation






1989 1991 1993 1995 1998 2000
Bank of Italy Special Microdataset Number Households in the Economy
40Table I: Concentration indexes.
Year C4 HHI GINI
89 0.69 2398 0.89
90 0.69 2058 0.89
91 0.69 1668 0.88
92 0.71 1696 0.88
93 0.67 1602 0.86
94 0.65 1628 0.84
95 0.66 1554 0.84
96 0.66 1631 0.86
97 0.65 1826 0.85
98 0.64 1522 0.84
99 0.65 1492 0.85
100 0.64 1431 0.84









1255.32 3.83 320.16 153.95 6.45
409.51 0.38 115.63 21.55 1.08
1325.54 3.89 328.95 160.70 6.76
398.92 0.40 123.83 24.88 1.18
1333.79 3.86 310.02 160.26 6.84
398.29 0.40 113.76 21.26 1.12
1408.93 3.93 320.01 166.54 7.01
416.09 0.39 120.14 21.25 1.13
1424.01 3.94 310.14 167.56 6.80
441.26 0.40 119.15 22.46 1.14
1487.49 3.93 307.29 168.52 6.42







Table III: Number of households in the Bank of Italy SHIW
1989 1991 1993 1995 1998 2000
1989 8274 2187 1050 827 544 404
1991 6001 2420 1752 1169 832
1993 4619 1066 583 399
1995 4490 373 245
1998 4478 1993
2000 4128
8274 8188 8089 8135 7147 8001
41Table IV: Bank of Italy special data section on vehicles’ purchase.
1989 1991 1993 1995 1998 2000
Purchase 764 852 688 689 867 856
Sale 123 169 130 111 134 108







1989 33 127 127
1991 36 156 53
1993 33 171 51
1995 34 188 60
1998 34 237 98
2000 37 260 62
1139 451
Table VI: Diﬀerence in distributions.
Year mean sd N mean sd N
1989 35.57 18.56 579 26.45 16.15 8192 19.56 1.47
1991 36.61 17.41 625 25.46 14.89 8108 19.56 1.39
1993 38.02 19.69 454 25.25 16.81 7963 17.53 1.42
1995 34.67 17.38 486 24.74 16.33 8055 18.38 1.75
1998 36.79 20.39 616 26.73 17.4 7029 15.93 1.46
2000 38.02 19.19 657 26.64 17.39 7881 18.33 1.45















β1 constant -18.737 -4.688 γ1 constant -1.715 -1.712
β2 modrep -0.043 -1.703 γ2 alimentation 0.323 2.804
β3 alimentation 0.800 3.076 γ3 cubic capacity 0.015 1.066
β4 cubic capacity -0.218 -1.302 γ4 length 0.352 4.136
β5 length 0.692 1.910 γ5 speed 1.158 4.040
β6s p e e d 4.431 4.722 γ6 fuel consumption 0.048 3.029
β7 fuel consumption 0.001 0.017 γ7 trunk size -0.005 -1.019
β8 trunk size -0.032 -1.015
alpha Prices -0.144 -2.381
NON LINEAR 
PARAMETERS
σ1 constant 0.647 0.324
σ2 cubic capacity 0.209 7.293
σ3 fuel consumption 0.033 4.383
σy Price-Income 1.585 1.973
Dummies for segments Yes Dummies for segments Yes
Dummies for firms Yes Dummies for firms Yes
Dummy for years Yes Dummy for years Yes
Cross dummies        
firms-years Yes
Cross dummies         
firms-years Yes
34The variables cubic capacity, trunk size and speed (see Table II) have been divided by
100.











β1 constant -20.395 -4.621 γ1 constant -1.465 -1.135
β2m o d r e p -0.028 -1.077 γ2 alimentation 0.304 3.449
β3 alimentation 0.470 1.518 γ3 cubic capacity 0.016 1.310
β4 cubic capacity 0.014 0.067 γ4l e n g t h0.322 2.200
β5l e n g t h 0.912 2.486 γ5 speed 1.071 3.295
β6 speed 4.391 4.531 γ6 fuel consumption 0.047 3.075
β7 fuel consumption -0.027 -0.300 γ7t r u n k  s i z e-0.007 -0.666
β8 trunk size -0.055 -1.523
alpha Prices -0.181 -2.825
NON LINEAR 
PARAMETERS
σ1 constant 1.270 0.470
σ2 cubic capacity 0.120 6.280
σ3 fuel consumption 0.008 3.934
σy Price-Income 1.177 2.005
Dummies for segments Yes Dummies for segments Yes
Dummies for firms Yes Dummies for firms Yes
Dummy for years Yes Dummy for years Yes
Cross dummies        
firms-years Yes
Cross dummies         
firms-years Yes
Table IX: Estimated diﬀerences own and sum cross-price elasticities (product
level).
mean sd mean sd
89 -13.94 21.23 -8.50 15.86
91 -11.95 24.60 -8.98 21.13
93 -8.39 18.09 -9.83 16.77
95 -9.28 14.64 -9.58 19.33
98 -11.70 17.91 -8.14 12.25
100 -14.25 22.08 -9.80 16.10
mean sd mean sd
89 3.99 3.32 2.09 1.81
91 2.40 1.54 1.72 1.27
93 2.37 1.02 1.89 1
95 3.49 1.87 2.47 2.67
98 3.83 2.97 2.18 1.36





35The variables cubic capacity, trunk size and speed (see Table II) have been divided by
100.
44Table X: A selected sample of the estimated own and cross-price elasticities
(year 2000, “coarse” income distribution).
-18.132 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.002
-1.642 0.026 0.024 0.025 0.055 0.068 0.043
-0.082 0.397 0.501 0.434 0.258 0.330 0.246
0.000 -12.906 0.001 0.001 0.011 0.015 0.008
0.028 -3.556 0.054 0.062 0.172 0.205 0.123
0.438 -0.471 0.340 0.332 0.309 0.360 0.228
0.000 0.000 -14.274 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.001
0.005 0.009 -3.309 0.009 0.023 0.027 0.017
0.095 0.057 -0.350 0.060 0.041 0.047 0.033
0.000 0.000 0.000 -13.289 0.002 0.003 0.002
0.006 0.013 0.011 -3.376 0.036 0.043 0.025
0.099 0.072 0.075 -0.340 0.069 0.083 0.050
0.001 0.004 0.003 0.003 -35.060 0.016 0.014
0.014 0.042 0.033 0.040 -19.906 0.170 0.098
0.059 0.083 0.066 0.081 -4.823 0.446 0.212
0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.006 -47.947 0.006
0.006 0.018 0.014 0.018 0.069 -26.649 0.045
0.028 0.037 0.029 0.037 0.182 -6.801 0.107
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 -23.650
0.002 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.013 0.015 -13.770





















Table XI: A selected sample of the estimated own and cross-price elasticities
(year 2000, “ﬁne” income distribution).
-14.901 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.001
-1.690 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.028 0.031 0.027
-0.170 0.430 0.487 0.454 0.290 0.330 0.292
0.001 -16.636 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.003
0.025 -3.324 0.035 0.037 0.064 0.067 0.056
0.489 -0.467 0.392 0.388 0.299 0.329 0.291
0.000 0.000 -18.072 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000
0.004 0.006 -3.183 0.006 0.009 0.010 0.008
0.092 0.065 -0.422 0.067 0.049 0.056 0.049
0.000 0.000 0.000 -16.722 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.005 0.008 0.007 -3.157 0.013 0.013 0.011
0.107 0.081 0.084 -0.431 0.063 0.069 0.060
0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 -29.192 0.008 0.005
0.015 0.027 0.024 0.026 -11.297 0.057 0.046
0.120 0.124 0.124 0.123 -3.306 0.234 0.190
0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 -35.566 0.002
0.007 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.023 -13.469 0.019
0.057 0.057 0.059 0.057 0.098 -4.275 0.090
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 -25.967
0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.007 -9.209




















































1 -10.90 0.20 3.91 -7.28 0.12 1.97
2 -42.28 0.61 9.40 -27.86 0.16 3.60
5 -51.13 1.27 12.60 -32.23 0.27 4.43
6 -18.17 0.02 7.00 -10.33 0.01 2.76
7 -5.45 0.07 2.72 -4.57 0.05 1.68
8 -4.10 0.02 2.27 -3.64 0.02 1.50
9 -3.67 0.00 1.47 -3.64 0.00 1.27
11 -4.44 0.37 1.90 -3.93 0.26 1.28
12 -5.78 0.18 2.80 -4.66 0.11 1.65
13 -5.34 0.02 2.47 -4.64 0.01 1.64
14 -4.49 0.02 2.59 -3.86 0.02 1.60
16 -22.78 . 10.27 -12.32 . 3.59
17 -77.17 0.25 20.08 -56.11 0.05 7.24
18 -44.81 0.07 14.09 -32.27 0.02 5.36
19 -5.55 0.02 3.25 -4.34 0.01 1.82
21 -8.72 0.13 3.36 -6.30 0.08 1.83
22 -32.66 0.10 9.45 -21.45 0.04 3.63
23 -16.60 . 5.63 -10.32 . 2.54
26 -4.94 0.00 2.70 -4.37 0.00 1.72
27 -2.23 . 0.75 -2.32 . 0.89
28 -48.82 1.62 10.77 -27.78 0.29 3.71
30 -19.11 0.09 7.14 -10.64 0.03 2.69
31 -8.98 0.08 4.14 -6.01 0.04 2.00
32 -4.89 0.05 2.28 -3.87 0.04 1.43
33 -5.94 0.10 2.88 -4.73 0.06 1.69
35 -111.57 0.25 20.03 -91.36 0.06 7.81
36 -7.01 0.17 2.96 -5.22 0.11 1.67
37 -5.66 0.02 2.60 -4.69 0.02 1.65
38 -26.38 0.02 7.95 -13.37 0.01 2.84
39 -4.57 0.03 2.47 -3.96 0.02 1.57
40 -3.72 0.02 2.27 -3.50 0.01 1.55
41 -10.66 . 5.97 -7.25 . 2.73
42 -13.89 0.01 5.77 -8.99 0.00 2.63
43 -3.61 0.01 2.02 -3.37 0.01 1.42
44 -6.50 . 3.34 -5.48 . 2.05
45 -8.15 0.08 3.59 -5.82 0.05 1.87
47 -6.67 0.25 2.66 -5.43 0.17 1.63
48 -21.04 0.10 7.25 -11.30 0.04 2.69
Coarse distribution Fine distribution
46